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The Installment Land Contract-A National 
Viewpoint? 
Grant S. Nelson* and Dale A. Whitman** 
The installment land contract is rarely used in some states, 
but in many it is the predominant means of vendor financing of 
land sales. Much has been written about it, but nearly all of the 
literature focuses on the law of one particular state or another. 
Our purpose here is to provide a nationwide perspective, with 
particular attention to the states in which the contract has been 
widely used and extensively litigated. We propose to examine the 
reasons for the installment contract's popularity, its advantages 
and disadvantages, and the risks it presents to both vendor and 
purchaser. 
The installment land contract is the most commonly used 
substitute for the mortgage or deed of trust. This device is also 
sometimes referred to as a "contract for deed" or a "long-term 
land contract." The installment land contract and the purchase 
money mortgage fulfill an identical economic function-the fi- 
nancing by the seller of the unpaid portion of the real estate 
purchase price. Under an installment land contract, the vendee 
normally takes possession and makes monthly installment pay- 
ments of principal and interest until the principal balance is paid 
off. The vendor retains legal title until the final payment is made, 
at which time full title is conveyed to the vendee. Such contracts 
may be amortized over time periods as short as a year or two or 
as long as twenty years or more. During the contract period, the 
vendee normally will be required to pay the taxes, maintain cas- 
ualty insurance, and keep the premises in good repair. 
It is important to distinguish the installment land contract 
from the ordinary executory contract for the sale of land, var- 
iously known a "binder," a "marketing contract," or an ''earnest 
money" contract. This latter type of contract is used primarily to 
establish the parties' rights and liabilities during the period be- 
tween the date of the bargain and the date of closing, usually only 
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a month or two later, on which title passes to the purchaser and 
security agreements, if any, are consummated. In contrast, the 
installment land contract governs the parties throughout the life 
of the debt, while the earnest money contract is completed at  
closing when the purchaser either tenders the full purchase price 
of the land or enters into a separate security agreement. Indeed, 
it is not uncommon for parties to agree to enter into an install- 
ment land contract at the closing date of the earnest money con- 
tract. 
When a vendee defaults under an installment land contract 
the vendor has several traditional remedies. He may sue "(1) for 
the installments which are due with interest thereon; (2) for spe- 
cific performance of the contract; (3) for damages for the breach; 
(4) to foreclose his vendee's rights; (5) to quiet title; or if he 
should desire, he may merely rescind the contract? These reme- 
dies, however, often involve litigation that may be too slow or 
expensive to be practical, and some of them depend on the 
vendee's capacity to satisfy a money judgment. Consequently, 
only the quiet title action is used with any great frequency. Its 
assertion is usually an outgrowth of the vendor's claim to his 
purported rights under a forfeiture clause. This clause, found in 
virtually every installment contract, typically provides that 
"time is of the essence" and that when a vendee fails to comply 
with the contract, including the obligation to pay promptly, the 
vendor has the option to declare the contract terminated, to re- 
take possession of the premises without legal process, and to re- 
tain all prior payments as liquidated damages. Generally, the 
clause also relieves the vendor from all further obligation under 
the contract. 
As one commentator has aptly pointed out, "[ilf the con- 
tract is enforceable as written and if title will not be clouded . . . 
[the installment land] contract gives the vendor a very favorable 
remedy, much more advantageous than would be available under 
a purchase money mortgage or deed of t r ~ s t . " ~  Indeed, under a 
mortgage or deed of trust, the defaulting mortgagor has a right 
to redeem (the equity of redemption) which the mortgagee can 
eliminate only by a foreclosure proceeding should the mortgagor 
prove to be uncooperative. The forfeiture clause in an installment 
1. Comment, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REV. 
240, 243 (1959). 
2. Id. at 244. See also Comment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 
41 ALBANY L. REV. 71, 73-74 (1977). 
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contract appears to give the vendor a remedy similar to foreclo- 
sure without any need for judicial action. For our purposes, how- 
ever, it is important to emphasize that if the vendee resists forfei- 
ture the installment land contract is advantageous only if it "is 
enforceable as written and if title will not be clouded." 
Installment land contracts have traditionally been used as  
mortgage substitutes in those states where the substantive law of 
mortgages and the foreclosure remedies are considered to be 
heavily pro-mortgagor. For example, in a substantial number of 
states, judicial foreclosure is the only method of foreclosing a 
mortgage. This procedure requires a full court proceeding in 
which all interested persons must be made parties, and is often 
time-consuming and costly. Against a mortgagor who contests the 
mortgagee's claims, it may take several years to conclude such an  
action. Thus, utilization of the installment land contract in such 
states, whatever its risks, is perhaps understandable. But the 
risks are high, as will be seen below. 
A. Some General Considerations 
Traditionally, installment land contract forfeiture provisions 
were routinely enforced in favor of the ~ e n d o r . ~  Enforcement of 
such provisions presumably was based on a desire to carry out the 
intent of the parties, even though forfeiture often resulted in a 
substantial loss to the vendee and in a windfall gain to the ven- 
d ~ r . ~  Enforcement became especially burdensome on the vendee 
as the contract neared completion and the vendee's cash invest- 
ment became increasingly substantial. Courts tended to ignore 
the mortgage substitute aspect of the installment land contract 
and to treat it instead as an executory contract for the sale of 
land. 
Today, however, the foregoing description of forfeiture clause 
enforcement a t  best serves as a point of departure. As has been 
observed, the law in this area is not susceptible to orderly analy- 
sis: "Not only does the law vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
but within any one state results may vary depending upon the 
type of action brought, the exact terms of the land contract, and 
3. See Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV. 786, 
788 (1961); Note, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28 U .  FLA. 
L. REV. 156, 159 (1975). 
4. Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV. 786,788 
(1961). 
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the facts of the particular case."5 The interplay of these various 
factors makes it extremely difficult to predict whether the buyer's 
interest will be forfeited. While forfeitures are still occasionally 
judicially enfor~ed,~ it nevertheless can be safely stated that in no 
jurisdiction today will a vendor be able to assume that forfeiture 
provisions will be automatically enforced as written. This change 
is the result of both legislative and judicial intervention to ame- 
liorate the harsh impact of automatic forfeiture. 
B. Statutory Limitations 
Several states have attempted to alleviate some of the harsh- 
ness in forfeiture clauses by enacting legislation regulating the 
circumstances under which forfeiture is permitted. These stat- 
utes often incorporate a "grace period" within which late pay- 
ments must be accepted. Perhaps the best example of this type 
of legislation is the Iowa statute.' It provides that installment 
land contracts may be cancelled only by following a specified 
procedure. The vendor must provide written notification to the 
defaulting vendee and to the person in possession of the real 
estate; the notice must identify the real estate, specify the terms 
of the contract that have not been complied with, and inform the 
vendee that he has thirty days in which to correct his default. If 
the vendee performs within this time period, the forfeiture is 
avoided. If he does not, the notice of forfeiture, together with 
proof of service, may be recorded to constitute constructive notice 
of the completed forfeiture. Several other states have statutes 
similar to that of 10wa;~ the grace period varies from thirty days 
in Iowa to as long as one year in North Dakota. In Minnesota, the 
grace period extends up to sixty days depending on the percen- 
tage of the contract price the vendee has already paid.) Some of 
these statutes permit nonjudicial forfeiture, while others allow it 
only by judicial action. It should be emphasized, however, that 
the purpose of these statutes is not to prevent forfeitures, but to 
alleviate the harshness of their operation.1° In this connection 
several observations should be made. 
5. Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 391, 416 (1966) 
(footnotes omitted). 
6. See, e.g., Ellis v. Butterfield, No. 12,086 (Idaho July 13, 1977), petition for rehear- 
ing filed, (Aug. 3, 1977). 
7. IOWA CODE ANN. !i!i 656.1-.6 (West 1950). 
8. See, e-g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 4 559.21 (West Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32- 
18-01 to 06 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. $ 5  21-50-01 to 07 (1967). 
9. MINN. STAT. ANN. !i 559.21 (West Supp. 1977). 
10. See Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV. 
786, 797 (1961). 
THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT 
First, the statutory grace period approach, as a practical 
matter, is analogous to the mortgage law concept of strict foreclo- 
sure. This mortgage foreclosure method, rarely used in the United 
States, allows a judicial grace period during which the mortgagor 
either pays the mortgage debt or forfeits the land to the mortga- 
gee." Similarly, if a vendee under an installment contract fails to 
correct a default within the statutory grace period, he loses the 
land. It is perhaps ironic that in some respects the statutory 
contract forfeiture procedures are more "pro-vendee" than the 
strict foreclosure concept is "pro-mortgagor." Under strict fore- 
closure, the mortgagor must pay the accelerated debt or lose the 
land. On the other hand, in such states as Iowa and Minnesota, 
the defaulting vendee need only pay the arrearages within the 
grace period, rather than the accelerated debt, in order to rein- 
state the contract.12 
Second, to some degree these statutes have institutionalized 
or formalized the forfeiture concept and, in so doing, may have 
tended to discourage judicial interference in those situations 
where the vendor complies with the statutory forfeiture method.13 
For example, the Iowa and Minnesota cases allowing forfeiture 
have been concerned for the most part with technical compliance 
with the statutory procedure and have tended to downplay any 
independent analysis of the fairness of the forfeiture.14 
Finally, one practical advantage of statutory regulation is 
that it encourages the stability of land titles. Whatever the de- 
fects in such statutory regulation, title examiners in many of 
these states apparently routinely approve of the titles derived 
through the statutory proceedings.15 There are a t  least two rea- 
sons for this. First, the tendency of the courts to discourage at- 
tacks on forfeitures on nonstatutory grounds encourages reliance 
on a forfeiture proceeding that complies with the applicable stat- 
ute. Second, many of these statutes provide for the recording of 
a written and formalized memorial of compliance with the stat- 
11. See G.  NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 229 (1976). 
12. See Hampton Farmers Coop Co. v. Fehd, 257 Iowa 555, 559, 133 N.W.2d 872,874 
(1965); Needles v. Keys, 149 Minn. 477, 480, 184 N.W. 33, 34 (1921); 51 IOWA L. REV. 488 
(1966). 
13. Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV. 786, 
797 (1961). 
14. See, e.g., id. at 792; Dale v. Pushor, 246 Minn. 254, 75 N.W.2d 595 (1956). 
15. Nelson, The Use of Installment Land Contracts in Missouri-Courting Clouds on 
Titles, 33 J .  Mo. B. 161, 164 (1977). 
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ute.16 As a result, the title examiner is able to rely on the record 
for evidence of a permissible forfeiture. This is true even where 
the original contract is recorded. On the other hand, in states that 
lack statutory control of the forfeiture process, the recording of a 
statement that forfeiture has occurred may be regarded by a sub- 
sequent title examiner simply as a self-serving assertion that in 
itself may constitute a cloud on title. 
The Maryland statute takes a substantially different ap- 
proach from those described above." Where an installment land 
contract for the sale of residential property to a noncorporate 
vendee is involved, forfeiture is prohibited. The vendor can utilize 
the land to satisfy the vendee's debt only through a foreclosure 
sale identical to that used for a mortgage? The vendee is entitled 
to receive any surplus from the sale-that amount by which the 
sale price exceeds the unpaid balance of the purchase price. Since 
installment land contracts are treated like mortgages in residen- 
tial transactions, there is apparently no incentive to continue 
their use in the residential setting. On the other hand, the com- 
mon law rules as to forfeiture presumably still apply to nonresi- 
dential installment land contracts.l8 
Recent Oklahoma legislation constitutes perhaps the most 
sweeping and decisive statutory regulation of installment land 
contracts. In one relatively short paragraph, an Oklahoma statute 
states that installment land contracts 
16. The Iowa statute exemplifies such a provision: 
If the terms and conditions as to which there is default are not performed 
within said thirty days, the party serving said notice or causing the same to be 
served, may file for record in the office of the county recorder a copy of the notice 
aforesaid with proofs of service attached or indorsed thereon (and, in case of 
service by publication, his personal affidavit that personal service could not be 
made within this state) and when so filed and recorded, the said record shall 
be constructive notice to all parties of the due forfeiture and cancellation of said 
contract. 
IOWA CODE ANN. 1) 656.5 (West 1950). 
17. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. 1)g 10-101 to 108 (1974); MD. R. P. W79. 
18. MD. R. P. W70 to W72, W77. 
19. Ohio legislation governing termination of installment land contracts is also some- 
what unique. It combines the "grace period" function with the additional requirement 
that after either five years or payment of twenty percent of the purchase price, judicial 
foreclosure is required. Thus, forfeiture is permitted and regulated during the early part 
of the contract, whereas mortgage law takes over thereafter. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
5313.01-.10 (1970). See also MONT. REV. CODES ANN. $4 52-401 to 417 (Cum. Supp. 1975), 
in which the Montana Small Tract Financing Act of 1963 made possible an optional power 
of sale deed of trust mechanism for tracts of 15 acres or less. One commentator has 
suggested that this legislation makes the installment land contract in Montana unneces- 
sary. See Note, Toward Abolishing Installment Land Sale Contracts, 36 Mom. L. REV. 
110 (1975). 
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for purchase and sale of real property made for the purpose or 
with the intention of receiving the payment of money and made 
for the purpose of establishing an immediate and continuing 
right of possession of the described real property, whether such 
instruments be from the debtor to the creditor or from the 
debtor to some third person in trust for the creditor, shall to that 
extent be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to 
the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, re- 
straints and forms as are prescribed in relation to mortgages.20 
The effect of this statutory provision is to treat all installment 
land contracts entailing a transfer of possession to the vendee as 
mortgages and thus to make the forfeiture remedy unavailable to 
a vendor. Thus, installment land contracts presumably have been 
rendered obsolete in Oklahoma. This legislation is especially sig- 
nificant in view of the fact that Oklahoma permits only judicial, 
and not power of sale, foreclosure of m~rtages.~' 
C. Judicial Limitations 
Absent statutory regulation, numerous state courts have in 
recent years refused to enforce against a defaulting vendee for- 
feiture clauses that the courts have deemed unreasonable or in- 
equitable. These courts have employed several approaches to 
save the vendee from forfeiture. Some cases, for example, have 
in effect conferred on the vendee a mortgagor's equity of redemp- 
tion, permitting him to tender the remainder of the purchase 
price (or even his arrearages) in a suit or counterclaim for specific 
performance of the contract. Where the vendee was unable or 
unwilling to redeem, courts have occasionally ordered the judicial 
foreclosure of the land contract. Finally, some courts, after deter- 
mining that a particular forfeiture clause is unfair, have extended 
to the defaulting vendee the right to restitution-the right to 
recoup his payments to the extent that they exceed the vendor's 
damages caused by the vendee's default. Of course, many state 
courts have not considered the forefeiture clause in all of the 
remedial contexts described above, nor have they always been 
theoretically precise. Some courts have utilized contract princi- 
ples to protect the defaulting vendee from an inequitable for- 
feiture provision. Other courts have gone a long way toward sim- 
ply treating the installment land contract as a mortgage-in 
much the same fashion as does the Oklahoma statute. Still others 
20. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, 1) 11A (West Supp. 1976). 
21. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 1) 686 (West 1960). 
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have employed a confusing amalgam of mortgage and contract 
law. The following sections examine these various approaches 
employed by state courts to mitigate the harshness of forfeiture. 
1. Waiver by the vendor as an excuse for delinquency 
Frequently a vendor will accept one or several late payments 
from his purchaser without taking action to declare a forfeiture. 
When the vendor finally reaches the end of his patience and in- 
forms the purchaser that forfeiture has occurred, the purchaser 
may argue that the vendor's prior behavior constitutes a waiver 
of the time provisions of the contract and that the vendor is 
legally bound to accept the late payments. Often this dispute is 
presented to the court in the context of a purchaser's suit or 
counterclaim for specific performance of the contract. The vendee 
may be willing to tender the entire purchase price, or he may 
insist upon an opportunity to make up his arrearages and resume 
the original payment schedule. 
Many cases have adopted the purchaser's position in this 
s i t u a t i ~ n . ~ ~  In effect, these cases hold that the vendor's waiver 
avoids the effect of the forfeiture clause and creates in the pur- 
chaser a right analogous to an equity of redemption. According 
to this view, if the vendor had given the purchaser clear notice 
that no further delinquencies would be tolerated, and if this no- 
tice had been given in adequate time to allow the purchaser to 
get back on schedule, the vendor might thereby have preserved 
his right of forfeiture as to future installments. Since he did not 
do so, the court itself will generally fix a reasonable time within 
which the purchaser must cure the delinquencies. 
The courts of Missouri and Utah have been particularly in- 
clined to employ this technique. One commentator aptly de- 
scribed the Missouri situation: 
Thus, Missouri courts today seem hesitant to give full effect 
to forfeiture provisions as measures of liquidated damages in 
installment land contracts. They are likely to find that such 
provisions have been waived by the vendor due to such acts as 
22. See In re Northern Ill. Dev. Corp., 309 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 
U . S .  965 (1963); Triplett v. Davis, 238 Ark. 870, 385 S.W.2d 33 (1964); Petersen v. Riden- 
our, 135 Cal. App. 2d 720, 287 P.2d 848 (1955); Krentz v. Johnson, 36 Ill. App. 3d 142, 
343 N.E.2d 165 (1976); Miles Homes, Inc. v. Mintjal, 17 Ill. App. 3d 642, 307 N.E.2d 724 
(1974); Pierce v. Yochum, 330 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. App. 1975); Soltis v. Liles, 275 Or. 537, 
551 P.2d 1297 (1976); Stinemeyer v. Wesco Farms, Inc., 260 Or. 109, 487 P.2d 65 (1971); 
Bradley v. Apel, 531 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 
1145 (Utah 1976); Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah 1975). 
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his acceptance of late payments of principal or of interest on late 
pay men ts after the delinquency of those payments. Further- 
more, waiver of forfeiture provisions is equally likely to be found 
in any of the following in which a land installment contract is 
involved: viz., an action for ejectment by a vendor, an action for 
specific performance by a defaulting vendee, a counterclaim for 
specific performance by a defaulting vendee who is defendant to 
an action for ejectment, or even a trespass action by a defaulting 
vendee against his vendor concerning the land that is the sub- 
ject of the contract. The finding that such a forfeiture provision 
has been waived would be very likely if the value of the land 
subject to the forfeiture provisions substantially exceeded the 
amount still unpaid under the contract .23 
The waiver cases tend to be variable and difficult to recon- 
cile. In some cases rather innocuous forbearances by vendors have 
been translated into favorable holdings for  purchaser^,^^ while in 
others quite substantial leniency has been ~nava i l ing .~~ In one 
Utah for example, the vendees under an installment land 
contract for the purchase of a house made sporadic late payments 
for the first two years of the contract. Some monthly payments 
were missed entirely. The vendor repeatedly demanded that the 
contract be paid up to date, but from time to time the vendees 
were assured that no forfeiture was contemplated "at that time." 
Finally, more than two years from the date of the contract, the 
vendor declared a forfeiture and after unsuccessful negotiation 
brought an unlawful detainer action to have vendees ousted and 
the contract forfeited. The trial court concluded that the vendor 
had waived the strict performance of the contract. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and upheld the forfeiture 
in the following language: "Under the circumstances of this case, 
we believe that the buyers . . . were given a reasonable length of 
time to clear themselves of default. . . . They had not paid the 
equivalent of the rental value of the property for the time they 
occupied it. "27 
The quoted language is quite telling. Obviously the amount 
of the payments in relation to the rental value has nothing a t  all 
to do with whether there was an effective waiver by the vendor. 
It is difficult not to conclude that the court was manipulating the 
23. 29 Mo. L. REV. 222, 226 (1964) (footnotes omitted). 
24. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. 
25. See, e.g., Economy Sav. & Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243,152 N.E.2d 
125 (1957); Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 (1942). 
26. Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948). 
27. Id. at 409, 195 P.2d at 751. 
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waiver concept as a means of deciding whether, in terms of fair- 
ness and economic equity, the purchaser should have another 
opportunity to make up his missed payments.28 Such decision- 
making may be entirely salutory, but it should not be disguised. 
2. Recognition of an equity of redemption 
A number of jurisdictions have taken the view that the pur- 
chaser, notwithstanding his default, should be granted a final 
opportunity to make up the missed payments before losing his 
land. Some courts view this right, analogous to a mortgagor's 
equity of redemption, as unconditional, while others are inclined 
to recognize it only if the purchaser's prior payments add up to a 
substantial investment or "equity" in the property. Sometimes 
the existence of the right is made to turn on whether the pur- 
chaser's payments significantly exceed the property's rental value 
or some similar test. The critical point is that, unlike the cases 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, these opinions do not rely 
upon a prior waiver by the vendor. 
A typical case is Nigh u. Hi~kman,~'  decided by the Missouri 
Court of Appeals. There a vendee under an installment land con- 
tract covering farmland had paid almost 35% of the total pur- 
chase price. The vendee then defaulted on one payment by fifteen 
days, and the vendor refused to accept the late payment. The 
vendee sued for specific performance and tendered the balance 
owing on the contract. The appellate court held that the trial 
court correctly granted specific performance and that enforce- 
ment of the forfeiture clause would have been inequitable. Al- 
though the contract contained no "time of the essence" clause, 
the court indicated that the result would not have been different 
had such a clause been present. 
The relationship between the granting of specific perform- 
ance to a purchaser and more traditional mortgage concepts is 
illustrated by the Florida Court of Appeals' opinion in H & L 
Land Co. v. Warner.30 There the vendee had made installment 
payments for about five years, but thereafter a four-year period 
elapsed during which no payments were made. During this period 
of nonpayment the vendor remained silent as to the vendee's 
-- 
28. The court may have been confusing the waiver concept with the principle of 
equitable relief from forfeiture. See text accompanying notes 29-43 infra. 
29. 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. App. 1976). See also Key v. Gregory, 553 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 
App. 1977). 
30. 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. App. 1972). See also Huguley v. Hall, 157 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 
1963); Mid-State Inv. Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. App. 1961). 
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default. The vendee ultimately sued for specific performance, 
tendering the balance of the purchase price; the vendor counter- 
claimed for removal of the contract as a cloud on the vendor's 
title. The court granted specific performance and stated: "[TJhe 
vendor under a specifically enforceable installment land sale con- 
tract, who has received part of the purchase price and has given 
the vendee possession of the land and the benefits and burdens 
of ownership, is in essentially the same position as a vendor who 
has conveyed the legal title and taken back a purchase money 
mortgage . . . ."31 The court implicitly imposed a t  least three 
conditions to be satisfied in order to qualify for specific perform- 
ance: (1) The vendee must be in possession or have a right to 
possession; (2) the contract must be specifically enforceable; and 
(3) the vendee must assert and exercise his right of redemption 
by tendering full performance .32 
There are problems with these conditions, especially with the 
last two. Arguably, tying these latter two requirements together 
is an inconsistent blending of contract and mortgage law. I t  is 
axiomatic that a vendee in default does not have a right to spe- 
cific performance of a contract. Yet under mortgage law the right 
to redeem is not exercised until there has been a default. In 
Warner, the second requirement was met because the court found 
that the vendor had waived the vendee's default. However, as has 
been pointed out: 
By so holding, the court is going in circles. If one must tender 
the unpaid balance as a condition precedent to the vesting of the 
right of redemption, then one must exercise this right before one 
is entitled to it-an anomaly, to be sure. Thus, the rights of 
mortgagors will not be extended to purchasers in default who are 
either in straitened circumstances or unaware of the right of 
redemption-the very individuals whom the mortgage statutes 
were designed to protect.33 
Notwithstanding this apparent anomaly, a more recent case rein- 
forces the argument that, in general, Florida installment land 
contracts will be treated as mortgages for redemption purposes. 
In Hoffman v. Semet,34 a Florida District Court of Appeals held 
that a vendee in default under an installment land contract had 
an equity of redemption and that the vendee's successor was enti- 
31. 258 So. 2d at 295. 
32. See Note, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28 U .  
FLA. L. REV. 156, 168-70 (1975). 
33. Id. at 170. 
34. 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1975). 
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tled to satisfy the total outstanding indebtedness due the vendor 
under the contract and to receive a conveyance of the real estate. 
The court cited Warner for the proposition that an installment 
land contract "must be deemed and held to be a mortgage, sub- 
ject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, 
restraints, and forms as are prescribed in relation to  mortgage^."^^ 
Unlike the situation in Warner, however, there had been no 
waiver of the default; therefore, the contract was not specifically 
enforceable within the implicit requirements of Warner. The 
Semet court did not deal with this difficulty. Instead, it simply 
repeated "equity of redemption" language in referring to the 
vendee's interest. 
The Kansas case of Nelson v. Rob in~on~~  illustrates how a 
court can sometimes refuse to enforce a forfeiture provision and 
in addition can impose a remedy that treats the installment land 
contract involved as an equitable mortgage. The vendors in 
Nelson brought an action to cancel an installment land contract 
for the sale of farmland. The vendee was over $1900 delinquent 
in back payments, but had paid nearly one third of the $48,000 
purchase price and had made valuable improvements to the land. 
The trial court refused to permit forfeiture, but rather ordered 
strict foreclosure of the contract. Under the terms of the decree, 
the vendee was given six months in which to pay the entire 
amount remaining due on the contract. Failure to so pay within 
that period would result in forfeiture of the land and back pay- 
ments to the vendor. If the vendee paid only the arrearages within 
ten days of the decree, however, the redemption period would 
have extended to eighteen months. Interestingly, the vendee, and 
not the vendor, appealed, and the Kansas Supreme Court af- 
firmed this exercise of equitable discretion of the trial court. It is 
noteworthy that the court here imposed the relatively rare mort- 
gage remedy of strict foreclosure which was sought by neither 
party, but in which the vendor acquie~ced.~' 
The Nelson decision clearly does not mean that all install- 
ment land contracts in Kansas will henceforth be treated as mort- 
gages. If, for example, the vendee's stake in the property had been 
substantially less, perhaps immediate forfeiture would have been 
orderedY The case, however, does illustrate that Kansas vendors 
35. Id. at 651. 
36. 184 Kan. 340, 336 P.2d 415 (1959). 
37. This mortgage remedy is apparently the standard method in Wisconsin for termi- 
nating a vendee. See Exchange Corp. v. Kuntz, 56 Wis. 2d 555, 202 N.W.2d 393 (1972). 
38. For a discussion of the significance of the proportion paid, see Croft v. Jensen, 
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cannot rely on automatic enforcement of the forfeiture clause. 
Thus, in Kansas, courts may very well apply the law of mortgages 
to some installment contracts and contract law to others. 
In California, the movement toward recognition of a right of 
redemption for a defaulting vendee has received a considerable 
impetus from general statutory provisions, although their appli- 
cation was somewhat uncertain until fairly recently.39 In Barhis 
v. Scott," the California Supreme Court reevaluated a long line 
of earlier precedents dealing with forfeiture. The court concluded 
that when a forfeiture would otherwise result, the vendee can be 
relieved therefrom under section 3275 of the Civil Code which 
provides that 
Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs 
a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forefeiture, by reason of 
his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved 
therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party, 
except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent 
breach of duty.*' 
The vendor in Barkis sought to quiet title and to enforce a forfeit- 
ure after the vendees inadvertently overdrew their bank account 
with their monthly house payment. The vendees' later efforts a t  
payment were refused by the vendor. The supreme court held 
that section 3275 should provide relief from forfeiture and that 
the vendees had established the right to keep the contract in 
force. Here the default was, at  most, negligent and not "grossly 
negligent, willful, or fraudulent." 
In MacFadden u. Walker,42 the California Supreme Court 
dealt with the "willful, but repentant defaulting vendee." There 
an elderly lady vendee had been in willful default over two years, 
but had paid over half of the purchase price. When the vendor 
sought to quiet title to the property, she counterclaimed for spe- 
cific performance, tendering the full amount due and owing on 
the contract. The court held that the policy against forfeitures 
includes granting the right to specific performance even when the 
default is willful, reasoning that, when taken together, the prohi- 
bition against punitive damages contained in section 3294 of the 
Civil Code, the strict limitations on the right to provide for liqui- 
86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198 (1935). 
39. See Note, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment Land 
Sale Contracts, 47 S .  CAL. L. REV. 191, 205 (1973). 
40. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949). 
41. CAL. CN. CODE $ 3275 (West 1970). 
42. 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971). 
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dated damages contained in sections 1670-1671, and the provision 
of section 3369 that "neither specific nor preventive relief can be 
granted to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case . . ." pre- 
vented a forfeiture having no reasonable relation to the damage 
caused by the vendee's breach even when that breach is willful. 
Although the court noted that "persuasive arguments" had been 
made by Professor John Hetland that installment land contracts 
should be treated like mortgages and deeds of trust and that 
willfully defaulting debtors should therefore have the right to 
redeem, i t  concluded that because the vendee was entitled to 
specific performance, "we need not decide whether she might also 
be entitled to some other remedy under the law governing secu- 
rity  transaction^."^^ 
From the viewpoint of vendors, the trend illustrated above 
toward recognition of an equity of redemption is rather frighten- 
ing. In the absence of statute, nothing but a court order can cut 
off an equity of redemption. In effect, this means that the vendor 
can be forced to litigate-precisely the thing he hoped to avoid 
by use of the installment contract. Even if the court will follow 
the example of the Supreme Court of Kansas, granting forfeiture 
in the event the purchaser is unable to redeem,44 the vendor's 
situation is far less advantageous than he expected when the 
contract was signed. 
3. Restitution 
In a jurisdiction in which no equity of redemption is yet 
recognized, or in a case in which the purchaser cannot or will not 
redeem, traditional analysis would suggest that forfeiture should 
follow. But along this dimension, too, the courts have been ac- 
tively reforming the law. Increasingly they are holding that for- 
feiture may not be "free" and that the vendor must return the 
payments he has received insofar as they exceed his actual dam- 
ages. Some courts, such as those of Utah, take this position only 
in cases in which they conclude that an outright forfeiture would 
be "unconscionable,"45 but this may simply mean that the pur- 
chaser would suffer a substantial net loss if no restitution were 
ordered .46 
43. Id. at 816, 488 P.2d at 1357, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 541. See also Williams Plumbing 
Co. v. Sinsley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 126 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1975) (where breach not inten- 
tional). 
44. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra. 
45. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954). 
46. The Utah court has had difficulty in reaching a consensus as to what is 
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The Utah cases usually measure the vendor's damages as the 
fair rental value of the property during the period of the pur- 
chaser's occupancy, plus such incidental damages as repairs and 
a sales commission upon resale.47 In most of the fact situations 
presented, courts have concluded that these items exceed the 
purchaser's payments and that he is not entitled to restitution. 
For example, in Strand u. M ~ y n e , ~ ~  the vendees under an install- 
ment land contract for the sale of a motel had made payments of 
principal and interest of over $19,000 on a $41,500 purchase price. 
They also spent $9,500 on repairs on the premises. Upon default, 
the vendors obtained possession by an unlawful detainer action. 
The vendees subsequently brought an action to recover the pay- 
ments made under the contract on the ground that retention by 
the vendor was unconscionable. The Utah Supreme Court af- 
firmed a summary judgment for the vendor, noting that the fair 
rental value of the motel up to the date of forefeiture, when added 
to the down payment the vendees had received on a resale of the 
property to a third party, exceeded the total of their payments to 
the vendors. The court observed that "[tlhis clearly shows that 
the amount they have lost under the forfeiture provision is not 
unconscionable . . . ."" Similarly, in Weyher u. Petersonm the 
Utah court concluded, in affirming a judgment for a vendor under 
a forcible entry and detainer action based on a forfeiture clause, 
that the rental value and damages, totalling $10,505, exceeded 
the $9,387 the vendee had paid on the contract and found no 
inequity in refusing to allow the vendee to recover some of his 
payments. 
Although vendees have generally not fared well in Utah liti- 
g a t i ~ n , ~ '  the reasoning of the above decisions indicates that com- 
plete vendor reliance on the forfeiture clause is probably mis- 
placed. In the above cases, the court upheld forfeiture because it 
believed the vendor's actual damages, based on the property's 
fair rental value, exceeded the vendee's payments. In the few 
Utah cases in which the vendee's payments exceeded the vendor's 
"unconscionable." See Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah 1976). 
47. See, e.g., Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). 
48. 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963). 
49. Id. at 357, 384 P.2d at 398. 
50. 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). 
51. One factor contributing to this litigation record is that few Utah vendees appear 
to record their contracts. Those who do record and subsequently default can probably 
settle with their vendors for at least the nuisance value of the suit which would be neces- 
sary to clear the vendor's title, since the damages and restitution issues are always litiga- 
ble. 
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damages, the court did order restitution to the vendee of the 
excess.52 
Florida cases also appear to impose a burden of showing 
unconscionability upon a purchaser who prays for restitution. 
Unfortunately, Florida courts have been less than carefully ana- 
lytic in articulating the relevant test and thus have made the 
availability of restitution quite unpredictable. In Chace u. 
Johnson,53 for example, the vendee was one year in default and 
sued to recover money totalling 80% of the contract price. The 
Florida Supreme Court ordered the vendor to return payments to 
the vendee that exceeded the vendor's damages. On the other 
hand, in Sawyer u. Marco Island Development C ~ r p . , ~ ~  where a 
vendor brought suit to remove from the record the interests of 
several vendees, one of whom was one year in default and who had 
paid 90% of the purchase price, a Florida appellate court held 
that vendee's interest could be extinguished without return of the 
payments made. Title to thirty-six lots was involved in Sawyer. 
Other vendees were also involved but  were represented by a 
guardian ad litem because they did not appear. None of the vend- 
ees so represented had paid over 25% of the purchase price. The 
vendee who had paid the 90%, however, was personally repre- 
sented. Despite the special circumstance of this last vendee, the 
court enforced forfeiture as to everyone, observing: 
We see a substantial difference between the unjust enrichment 
which would result if a large deposit were forfeited within a short 
period of time and a situation where a vendor has removed his 
property from the market for several years while the vendee 
abandons the contract by ceasing to make further payments 
. . . .  
55 
The purchaser's restitution remedy is perhaps best devel- 
oped in California. It should be noted first that, under the rule 
of Venable u. Harmon,56 a vendor cannot receive a deficiency 
judgment regardless of his loss. Beyond this, California antifor- 
feiture cases also compel the vendor to return to the vendee any 
amount paid in excess of the vendor's damages. In Freedman u. 
Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish, 57 for ex- 
52. Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah 1976); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 
P.2d 294 (1954). 
53. 98 Fla. 118, 123 So. 519 (1929). 
54. 301 So. 2d 820 (Fla. App. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 757 (1975). 
55. 301 So. 2d at 821. 
56. 233 Cal. App. 2d 297, 43 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1965) (based on CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
580b (West 1970)). 
57. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951). 
4 
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ample, the California Supreme Court held that it violated the 
public policies against forfeitures, penalties, and unjust enrich- 
ment to deny restitution, even to a vendee willfully in default. 
There have been problems, however, in determining the amount 
of restitution to which the vendee is entitled. Under the reasoning 
of the California Supreme Court decision in Honey v. Henry's 
Franchise Leasing Gorp.," the vendor apparently has the option 
of measuring his damages by either the "rental value" (giving 
restitution of the amount by which the vendee's payments exceed 
the fair rental value of the property while the vendee was in 
possession) or the "difference value" (giving restitution of the 
amount by which the vendee's payments exceed the difference 
between the current market value and the higher original con- 
tract price) ." Professor Hetland points out that "rarely over the 
past few decades has the value of the property dropped so that 
the vendor prefers difference value to his alternative mea- 
sure-rental value?O The choice is the vendor's, according to 
Honey, because permitting the vendee to make it would in effect 
give all installment vendees an option to convert their contracts 
into leases-an advantage the court hardly thought appropriate 
to give to a defaulter. 
I t  is interesting to note that the economic results of the 
"difference value" measure of restitution are roughly similar to 
those of a judicial sale, in the sense that the market value of the 
property is debited against the vendor's claim. Of course, the two 
approaches are distinct, since in a restitution case the property's 
value is measured by the court upon the testimony of witnesses, 
rather than by a sale? 
58. 64 Cal. 2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966). 
59. The court noted that since recission was not sought by the vendor, the rental 
value standard was inappropriate; the court consequently held that the proper calculation 
involved the difference value. 
60. J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSA~IONS 52 (1974). 
61. If the California Supreme Court's formulation of the "difference value" measure 
of restitution is taken literally, then it  seems subject to serious criticism. The problem is 
illustrated by the following example. 
Assume P buys property from V under an installment contract. The pertinent facts 
of the transaction are: 
Purchase price = $30,000 
Down payment = 2,000 
Original debt - 28,000, 8% interest, 25-year maturity 
Monthly payments = 216.11 
Suppose default occurs after five years and that the value of the property has declined, 
so that: 
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Value of property = $25,000 
Balance on debt = 25,836.58 (based on standard mortgage 
payment tables) 
If foreclosure by judicial sale occurs, and if the costs of foreclosure are neglected and the 
sale brings fair market value, the sale proceeds will be $25,000; V will be entitled to a 
deficiency judgment of $836.58, assuming no antideficiency statute. (In California, no 
such judgment will be permitted if a one-to-four-family house is involved. CAL. CIV. PRoc. 
CODE Ej 580b (West 1970).) 
Suppose that V, instead of seeking foreclosure, elects to terminate P's rights under 
the contract and to make restitution, as he is permitted to do under Honey. V must restore 
to P all payments made in excess of V's loss. V elects the "difference value" measure of 
loss. 
Payments made = $14,966.60 ($215.11 per  mo. x 60 months) 
including $2,000 down payment 
(-1 V's loss - 5,000.00 ($30,000 minus $25,000) 
Restitution - 9,966.60 
Thus, instead of being entitled to a deficiency judgment, V must pay back to P nearly 
$10,000. This is, to say the least, a strange result. 
The problem is that the court, in computing the amount of restitution, has ignored 
the "time value" of money. In a short-term marketing contract for $30,000, if P breaches 
and V must remarket the property one month later for $25,000, it is reasonably accurate 
to say that V's damages are $5,000. See Jensen v. Dalton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 654,88 Cal. Rptr. 
426 (1970). If, however, the period between contract and breach is five years (during which 
V has not had possession), the $5,000 damage figure is completely erroneous. Let us 
recompute V's damages, but in doing so translate all amounts involved to a single point 
in time by computing future values for each amount involved, using compound interest 
tables. We may select any point in time we wish, but a convenient reference point is the 
fifth annivei-sary of the sale-which happens to be the date of default. (This is convenient 
because nothing of financial significance happens thereafter, and whatever V's damages 
are on that date can easily be translated to their value on the date of judgment simply by 
adding interest.) 
In order to make translations of values to any given date, we must assume some 
interest or discount rate. Let us use 896, since it is the figure selected by the parties 
themselves when they initiated the transaction. Here is what actually happened: 
Date 
1-1-0 V gives u p  $30,000 asset, receives $2,000 cash. 
Fu ture  value of $28,000, as of 1-1-5 = $41,715.66 (+) 
2-1-0 V receives regular monthly payments of 
through $216.11. Future  value of $216.1 1 /mo. for  
1-1-5 60 months = $15,879.08 (-) 
1-1-5 V receives back the property, worth $25,000 = $25,000.00 (-) 
Subtract ing what  V received from w h a t  he  gave up, 
damages = $ 836.58 
Thus the "difference value" approach to restitution, properly computed, yields results 
exactly equal to a foreclosure sale. Of course, under California law, V cannot actually 
recover the $836.58 deficiency. Venable v. Harmon, 233 Cal. App. 2d 297, 43 Cal. Rptr. 
490 (1965). 
No California case appears clearly to recognize the foregoing problem. Perhaps the 
closest is Kudokas v. Balkus, 26 Cal. App. 3d 744, 103 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972), a "difference 
value" case in which the court refused to allow the vendees to claim, as part of their 
"payments," the interest they had paid prior to default on deeds of trust they had as- 
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4. Foreclosure as a mortgage 
The trend of the cases discussed above is clearly toward ap- 
plication of mortgage concepts to aid defaulting purchasers. The 
logical conclusion of this trend would be an absolute equivalency 
of installment contracts and mortgages, with foreclosure becom- 
ing the exclusive means by which a vendor could realize upon his 
security interest in the property. For a court to take this position 
should hardly seem surprising, for the judiciary reached the same 
conclusion long ago with regard to other forms of mortgage substi- 
tutes. Nevertheless, our research has disclosed only two states, 
California and Indiana, whose courts have indicated an accept- 
ance of this view without legislative intervention. 
California cases actually include no direct holding that fore- 
closure is a proper remedy in an installment contract default. 
However, a California Supreme Court decision, Honey v. Henry's 
Franchise Leasing C ~ r p . , ~ ~  and an opinion by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co. ,63 imply that 
a judicial sale would be appropriate if at least one of the parties 
requests it. To date there appears to be no California appellate 
opinion in which either purchaser or vendor has sought a judicial 
sale, and thus the language in the cases mentioned must be re- 
garded as dicta. If taken at face value, however, the language 
makes California the most protective state from the purchaser's 
viewpoint, with an equity of redemption, restitution, and judicial 
sale all available to him. 
In Indiana the case for judicial sale is both better defined and 
less dependent on the wishes of the parties. In Skendzel v. 
M a r ~ h a l l , ~ ~  the vendor sought a judicial declaration of forfeiture 
of a vendee's interest where the vendee had already paid $21,000 
of a $36,000 contract price. The Indiana Supreme Court applied 
the concept that "equity abhors a forfeiture" and held that en- 
forcement of the forfeiture clause was "clearly excessive" and 
sumed. Id. at 756; 103 Cal. Rptr. a t  325. Even this holding does not address the problem 
systematically. 
The "future value" problem is also raised in "rental value" restitution cases, but its 
impact is relatively slight if the vendee's payments have been fairly regular prior to default 
and if they approximate the rental value of the property. 
62. 64 Cal. 2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966). 
One other decision by the California Supreme Court suggests the availability of 
foreclosure in the installment contract context. See MacFadden v. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 
488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971). 
63. 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957). 
64. 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973). 
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"unreasonable." More significantly, however, the court treated 
the installment land contract as a mortgage: 
The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale 
with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the 
vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the 
vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage. Realistically, 
vendor-vendee should be viewed as mortgagee-mortgagor. To 
conceive of the relationship in different terms is to pay homage 
to form over s ~ b s t a n c e . ~ ~  
The court ordered that the contract be foreclosed judicially in 
accordance with Indiana mortgage procedure. While the court did 
not absolutely rule out forfeiture in all cases, it did limit applica- 
tion of forfeiture to cases of absconding or abandoning vendees or 
to situations in which a minimum amount has been paid and the 
vendee seeks to retain possession while the vendor is making ex- 
penditures for taxes, insurance, and maintenance. 
Skendzel has been followed in several subsequent decisions 
by Indiana appellate courts. For example, in Tidd v. Stauffer," 
a defaulting vendee sought to obtain specific performance by pay- 
ing the remaining balance where $16,000 out of a $39,000 contract 
price had been paid. The Court of Appeals of Indiana noted that 
forfeiture was inappropriate and directed the trial court to order 
judicial foreclosure of the contract in the event that the vendees 
failed promptly to pay the balance of the contract price. In Fisel 
v. Yoder," a vendee in default who had paid one-fourth of the 
purchase price was allowed to continue to make payments on the 
contract; the vendor's request for forfeiture was denied. On the 
other hand, in Dolurldson v. Sellmer," the Court of Appeals of 
Indiana affirmed a trial court's award of forfeiture to a vendor 
where the vendee had paid $7,000 out of a $23,158 purchase price. 
There the appellate court agreed that the case fell within an 
exception to Skendzel in that the vendee "had wholly failed to 
perform his obligation to acquire adequate insurance and had 
allowed the property to deteriorate to such an extent that sub- 
stantial repair was necessary before the house would even be 
habitable? 
-- 
65. Id. at 234, 301 N.E.2d at 646. 
66. 308 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. App. 1974). 
67. 320 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. App. 1975). 
68. 333 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. App. 1975). 
69. Id. at 866. In Goff v. Grahab, 306 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. App. 1974), forfeiture of an 
installment land contract was upheld because of evidence showing that the vendee had 
failed to insure as required by the contract, had committed waste, and had deliberately 
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Thus in Indiana, in most instances where the defaulting 
vendee has a substantial equity, installment land contracts are 
now treated as mortgages. Because of the exceptions noted above, 
Skendzel does not go as far judicially as Oklahoma went legisla- 
tively in converting installment land contracts into mortgages. 
Nonetheless, the case constitutes the clearest judicial statement 
to date of that principle.70 
There is every reason to expect this movement to continue, 
particularly in states in which there is little or no statutory regu- 
lation of land contracts. The same factors that induced the courts 
to treat other mortgage substitutes as mortgages-particularly 
the necessitous borrower's willingness to sign anything presented 
to him and the potential for a harsh and unwarranted loss of his 
investment as a consequence of his default-should and will al- 
most surely be increasingly persuasive in the installment contract 
context. 
It is sometimes argued that this trend is undesirable and that 
it is socially advantageous for the law to provide an extremely 
quick and cheap method for a vendor to terminate his purchaser's 
interest in the real estate upon default. Such a procedure, it is 
said, encourages the extension of credit to individuals whose 
creditworthiness is so poor that they would otherwise be unable 
to transact at all. There are, however, two errors in this argument. 
First, the cases discussed above illustrate that no vendor today 
can count on forfeiture under a land contract as being either 
quick or cheap; indeed, it is an invitation to litigation. Second, 
no procedure, however quick or cheap, can be justified if it 
amounts to foul play. The solution, of course, is not for the law 
to ignore the legitimate needs of installment contract purchasers, 
but to reform the modes of foreclosure commonly used for mort- 
gages to make them as inexpensive and rapid as feasible, consis- 
tent with the requirements of fairness and due process. If this is 
done, land contracts (if they continue to exist a t  all) can be 
brought within the ambit of the more efficient mortgage foreclo- 
sure proceedings, and no one will have cause for complaint. Per- 
haps the growing tendency of the courts to treat land contracts 
as mortgages will bring pressure on state legislatures to accom- 
neglected the property. The vendee had paid a down payment of $1,950 and one monthly 
payment of $562.62 on a contract price of $61,750 amortized over 20 years. 
70. For analysis of the Indiana situation, see Bepko, Contracts and Commercial Law, 
8 IND. L. REV. 116, 117-20 (1974); Polston, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana 
Law-Property, 10 IND. L. REV. 297, 298 n.4 (1976); Strausbaugh, Exorcising the Forfeit- 
ure Clause From Real Estate Conditional Sales Contracts, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 71 (1975). 
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plish the needed reforms of mortgage law. 
In light of the judicial trend outlined above, we must ask why 
installment land contracts continue to be used. The question is 
particularly perplexing in those states in which relatively rapid 
nonjudicial foreclosure is available for mortgages or deeds of 
trust. The reason given several years ago by Professor William 
Warren may still be applicable: "[Tlhe vendor continues to use 
the instalment sale contract despite its deficiencies with regard 
to remedies because he is willing to gamble that the vendee's 
rights under this device will never be asserted and his own con- 
tractual advantages will not be ~hallenged."~' In addition, it is 
possible that neither most vendors nor most real estate brokers 
have an accurate concept of the risks of litigation that land con- 
tracts present today. Whatever the motivations of vendors, it is 
clear that the risks are inflating rapidly. 
5. Constitutionality of forfeiture 
In recent years power of sale mortgage and deed of trust 
foreclosure procedures have been under increasing attack as vio- 
lative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.72 
The constitutional questions presented by these attacks may be 
raised as well in the context of installment contracts. Space does 
not permit a detailed discussion of these cases here, but in es- 
sence they have focused on two aspects of the foreclosure process: 
notice and hearing. Many power of sale statutes do not provide 
for any notice, or only notice by publication or posting, to the 
debtor and to junior lienors." In addition, the statutes usually 
make no provision a t  all for a hearing, either before or after the 
foreclosure. If the due process clause is applicable to the foreclo- 
sure process, it is very clear that many statutes violate the stan- 
dard articulated by the Supreme Court in Mullane u. Central 
71. Warren, California Instalment Land Sales Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 608, 633 (1962). 
72. See Leen, Galbraith, & Gant,  Due Process and Deeds of Trust-Strange 
Bedfellows?, 48 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1973); Nelson, Deed of 7'rust Foreclosure Under 
Powers of Sale-Constitutional Problems-Legislative Alternatives, 28 J .  Mo. B. 428 
(1972); Pedowitz, Current Developments in Summary Foreclosure, 9 REAL PROP. PRoB. & 
TRUST J .  421, 425-31 (1974); Comment, The Constitutionality of the California Trustee's 
Sale, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1282 (1973); Comment, Due Process Problems of Mississippi Power 
of Sale Foreclosure, 47 MISS. L.J. 67 (1976); Comment, Notice Requirements of the Non- 
judicial Foreclosure Sale, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1110 (1973); Comment, Power of Sale Foreclo- 
sure After Fuentes, 40 U .  CHI. L. RBV. 206, 217-20 (1972). 
73. See, e.g., D.C. CODE $45-615 (1973); MISS. CODE ANN. !j 89-1-55 (1972). Cf. MINN.  
STAT. ANN. $ 580.03 (West 1947) (personal service on person in possession only). 
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Hanover Bank & Trust C O . , ~ ~  since the notice they provide is "not 
reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed 
by other means at hand."75 The hearing standard is not quite so 
clear, but there is a strong probability that on the merits the total 
absence of a presale hearing would also be held unconstitu- 
tional. 76 
The application of these due process standards to install- 
ment contract forfeitures is somewhat uncertain, and no cases 
seem to have been reported. But some observations may never- 
theless be safely made. Many contract forms do provide for direct 
mail notice to the purchaser as a prerequisite to forfeiture, and 
this would certainly meet the Mullane standard.77 However, as in 
the case of mortgages, a contract procedure that provided only 
publication notice or the like would not. Installment contracts 
almost never provide for a hearing, and on this point they are as 
suspect as power of sale mortgages. 
Whether it will ever be necessary for the contract forfeiture 
process to withstand scrutiny on the merits of the due process 
clause is questionable, however. Two defenses raised, often suc- 
cessfully, by power of sale mortgages appear to be similarly ap- 
plicable to the contract situation. The first is waiver. If the con- 
tract itself contains language by which the purchaser authorizes 
a forfeiture by the vendor without notice or hearing, can the pur- 
chase later be heard to complain that his constitutional rights 
were violated? In related contexts, the Supreme Court has held 
that the efficacy of such a contractual waiver depends on a vari- 
ety of factors, including the specificity of the waiver, the relative 
equality of bargaining power of the parties, the sophistication of 
the waiving party, and perhaps whether the waiver was part of a 
74. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
75. Id. at 319. This conclusion has been reached in three mortgage foreclosure cases. 
See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 
F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Law v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
76. See United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Ricker v. 
United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 
(W.D.N.C. 1975); Gamer v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); 
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), reu'd on 
other grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975). Contra, Guidarelli v. Lazaretti, 233 N.W.2d 
890 (Minn. 1975). 
77. Junior liens may, of course, be created by contract vendees. For example, a 
vendee may mortgage his contract interest. If such an interest exists and is recorded or 
otherwise readily identifiable by the vendor, failure of the vendor to provide notice to the 
junior lienor may raise the same due process issues as in the analogous first mortgage 
foreclosure situation. But see Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 463-64, 452 P.2d 222, 
227-28 (1969) (holding, without discussion of constitutional principles, that the vendee's 
junior mortgagee was cut off by the vendor's forfeiture notwithstanding lack of notice). 
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printed contract.78 Obviously each case must be litigated upon its 
facts, but in the typical installment contract transaction the 
waiver is probably not very explicit, is part of the printed form, 
and is generally not a point of negotiation; the purchaser will 
often be able to make a t  least a colorable argument that the 
purported waiver does not bind him. 
The second defense that power of sale mortgagees have as- 
serted in constitutional litigation is that no state action is in- 
volved in such foreclosures. State action is, of course, a prerequi- 
site to applicability of the fourteenth amendment; if nonjudicial 
foreclosure is deemed a purely private process, no due process 
standard need be met. The plaintiffs in these cases have sought 
to show the presence of state action, pointing out that in most 
states in which power of sale foreclosure is widely employed, it is 
authorized and regulated by statute. A few early cases found state 
action to be present,79 but the clear trend of recent decisions is 
against such a finding.80 There is no Supreme Court decision yet 
on the point, but the probabilities are that state action will be 
found absent in the typical power of sale mortgage foreclosure. 
Superficially, this conclusion seems equally valid with regard 
to installment contract forfeitures. By the terms of the typical 
contract, no judicial action is necessary to effect a forfeiture, and 
no state official is involved except perhaps the recorder of deeds, 
whose duties are entirely mechanical. However, both the Iowa- 
style recording-of-forfeiture statutes and the recent cases dis- 
cussed above permitting redemption, restitution, or judicial sale 
78. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); 
D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Mortgage foreclosure cases rejecting 
the mortgagee's waiver argument include Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. 
Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Gamer v. Tri-State 
Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Law v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1233 
(N.D. Ga. 1973). Cf. Huggins v. DeMent, 13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412 (provision in 
deed for foreclosure upon default found to constitute sufficient notice for due process 
requirements), appeal dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1071 
(1972); 51 N.C.L. REV. 1110 (1973). 
79. See Turner v. Blackbum, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Northrip v. Federal 
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Turner relies heavily upon the 
rather peculiar participation of the clerk of the court in nonjudicial foreclosures under the 
then-applicable North Carolina statute. 
80. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975); Barrera 
v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Y Aleman Corp. v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 414 F. Supp. 93 (D. Guam 1975); Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072 
(D. Ariz. 1976); Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Global Indus., Inc. 
v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Howlett, 
521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1026 (1975). 
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at the behest of the purchaser may actually strengthen the state 
action argument. If the state, through its court system, actively 
superintends forfeiture procedures generally, its involvement is 
arguably sufficient to trigger the protections of the fourteenth 
amendment.81 The fact that the contract itself says nothing about 
such state involvement is probably irrelevant. It may seem ironic 
that the state, by providing certain minimal protections, becomes 
constitutionally obligated to provide greater ones, but that pecu- 
liarity is actually built into the fourteenth amendment state ac- 
tion concept. In any event, these constitutional theories must be 
taken seriously; plainly, their existence further increases the liti- 
gation risk of the vendor who elects to secure his debt with an 
installment contract. 
Even if the courts ultimately conclude that land contract 
forfeitures generally involve no state action, the current posture 
of constitutional litigation may well have a direct bearing on the 
future of the installment contract. This is true because in many 
of these cases the creditor is a government agency, so that the 
presence of governmental action is incontestibly clear.82 In all 
such cases to date, the security instrument in question has been 
a mortgage or a deed of trust; government agencies rarely sell 
land on installment contracts. Nonetheless, the holdings of un- 
constitutionality of power of sale foreclosure procedures that the 
courts are writing in these government agency cases will put in- 
creasing pressure on state legislatures to revise their power of sale 
statutes, bringing them into compliance with constitutional stan- 
dards of notice and hearing. In some cases these legislative revi- 
sions may be so extensive as to sweep in the installment contract, 
placing it on an equal footing with the mortgage or deed of trust 
for foreclosure purposes. Even where this does not occur, the ex- 
istence of a revised, constitutionally approved foreclosure proce- 
dure may be sufficiently attractive to vendors that they will adopt 
documents which employ that procedure, rather than continuing 
to assume the litigation risks inherent in the installment con- 
tract. 
81. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 
1974), rev'd, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975), in which the district court held the Michigan 
power of sale foreclosure procedure to be state action on the ground that the statute 
encouraged mortgagees to opt for nonjudicial foreclosure. The argument is not, however, 
a powerful one, and was rejected by the Sixth Circuit. Cf. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 
163 (1972) (finding an extensive scheme of state regulation of liquor licenses insufficient 
to implicate state action in the racial discrimination practices by a private club). 
82. See, e.g., United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977). 
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III. TITLE PROBLEMS UNDER INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS 
A. Problems for Vendees 
When a person purchases property as a vendee under an 
installment land contract, the chances of title problems with re- 
spect to the vendee's interest are greater than if the transaction 
were cast in the purchase money mortgage setting. This is true, 
to a large extent, even in those jurisdictions that have reduced the 
impact of the forefeiture provision by statute or judicial decision. 
In the usual purchase money mortgage situation, the chances 
are extremely high that the purchaser will examine the seller's 
title and require it to be marketable. Even if the purchaser is not 
sophisticated enough to have the title checked, any third party 
lender involved in the transaction will insist upon a title insur- 
ance policy or a t  least upon an attorney's title opinion as evidence 
that the seller's title is good. On the other hand, in installment 
land contract situations there is a strong possibility that the ven- 
dor's title will not be examined a t  the time the contract is exe- 
cuted. Here there usually is no third party lender to insist upon 
title examination-the vendor serves that economic function, and 
he is unlikely to insist upon an examination of his own title. 
Moreover, many contract purchasers have low incomes and either 
cannot afford a title examination or do not recognize the need for 
it. Accordingly, many purchasers may unknowingly execute a 
contract, go into possession, and make substantial installment 
payments when in fact the vendor's title is encumbered by mort- 
gages, judgment liens, or other interests perfected prior to the 
execution of the contract.83 
The recording act can also cause substantial problems for an 
installment land contract vendee. In the usual purchase money 
mortgage transaction, the deed to the mortgagor and the mort- 
gage or deed of trust will be recorded almost immediately. If there 
is no third party lender, the purchaser will record his deed as a 
matter of custom. Any third party lender involved will insist upon 
and carry out immediate recordation in order to protect itself 
against subsequent interests and encumbrances that may be cre- 
ated by or rise against the mortgagor. This recording by the mort- 
gagee will also protect the mortgagor against any subsequent in- 
terests arising through the former owner of the land. On the other 
83. See generally Mixon, Installpent Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income Trans- 
actions, with Proposals for Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in 
the Inner City, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 523, 545-46 (1970). 
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hand, in the installment land contract situation there is no third 
party stimulus for prompt recording. Many unsophisticated 
vendees do not record and, as we shall see later, actually may be 
prevented from recording by acts of the vendor.84 Since vendors 
anticipate a high default rate among vendees, it  is in the vendors' 
interest that the contracts not be recorded so that they may 
quickly resell to other purchasers without the necessity of a judi- 
cial proceeding to remove a title cloud posed by a recorded con- 
tract? Suppose, for instance, that after executing the contract, 
a vendor either mortgages the land or sells it to another pur- 
chaser. While it is true in many jurisdictions that possession by 
the original vendee will constitute constructive notice to those 
dealing with the land thereafter and thus will be the equivalent 
of re~ording,~~ this is not universally the case. Even if possession 
does constitute constructive notice, establishing the existence of 
that possession could require litigation, while the fact of a re- 
corded document would 
Even if the vendee does receive assurance prior to the execu- 
tion of the contract that the vendor has good title, and even if the 
vendee records promptly, the installment land contract transac- 
tion could pose additional problems for the vendee that would not 
be present in a purchase money mortgage transaction. Suppose, 
for example, that four years into a ten-year installment contract, 
the vendor goes into bankruptcy. Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Act provides that "[tlhe trustee shall assume or reject an execu- 
tory c ~ n t r a c t . " ~ ~ e c a u s e  of the rule of In re New York Investors 
Mutual Group, Inc., 8g this statutory provision presents serious 
- 
84. See text accompanying note 103 infra. 
85. See Mixon, supra note 83, a t  547. 
86. See, e.g., Drey v. Doyle, 99 Mo. 459, 12 S.W. 287 (1889); Comment, Possession 
as Notice Under Missouri Recording Act, 16 Mo. L. REV. 142 (1951). 
87. Failure to record an installment land contract may also cause problems for the 
vendee when the vendor goes into bankruptcy. This is because section 70(c) of the Bank- 
ruptcy Act authorizes a bankruptcy trustee in his status as a hypothetical lien creditor to 
take advantage of state recording statutes to defeat an unrecorded interest. If, under state 
law, such a contract is recordable (and they generally are) and an unrecorded interest is 
invalid against creditors who obtain a judgment lien without notice of the unrecorded 
interest, a bankruptcy trustee may be able under section 70(c) to avoid the contract. In 
re Sayre Village Manor, 120 F. Supp. 215 (D.N.J. 1954); Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in 
Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 477, 493-97 (1973); Lynn, Bankruptcy and the Land 
Sales Contract: The Rights of the Vendee Vis-A- Vis the Vendor's Bankruptcy Trustee, 5 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 677, 694-99 (1974). Normally, however, possession will be the equiva- 
lent of recording. See Lacy, supra at 496. In some states where possession is not construc- 
tive notice, however, a nonrecording vendee in possession may be vulnerable under section 
7O(c). See note 86 supra. 
88. 11 U.S.C. $ 110(b) (1970). 
89. 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
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problems for a vendee. In that case, a land contract vendee con- 
tended that he was entitled to specific performance against the 
bankruptcy trustee who had disaffirmed the contract under the 
above statute. The vendee contended that disaffirmance divested 
it of its equitable title to the land. The court, however, concluded 
that any rights of the vendee originated solely in the contract and 
that section 70(b) apparently did not exclude contracts for the 
sale of real estate from the trustee's power to reject executory 
contracts. Professor Warren has commented that application of 
the New York Investors rule would leave an installment land 
contract vendee "with a claim for damages instead of a home."g0 
Despite this criticism, subsequent decisions have followed the 
New York Investors case." Professor Frank R. Lacy, however, has 
pointed out that the contracts in all these later cases may have 
been executory or earnest money contracts rather than true in- 
stallment land contracts. He contends that true installment land 
contracts are the functional equivalent of purchase money mort- 
gages: "[the vendee] has made his payments in reliance on a 
particular asset belonging to the vendor, and this, taken with his 
right of possession and the substantial protection against loss of 
his rights even though he may default, justifies full preservation 
of his right to the property in the vendor's b a n k r ~ p t c y . " ~ ~  Such 
equities do not exist in the "truly executory" contract contem- 
plating conveyance, payment of the full price, and a closing date 
in the near future. I t  remains possible, however, that absent 
amendment of section 70(b), the principle of New York Investors 
will be applied to installment land  contract^.^^ 
While vendor bankruptcy presents risks to a land contract 
vendee, the existence of federal tax liens against the vendor is no 
longer a problem for the prudent vendee who has title examined 
prior to contract execution and who has actually recorded the 
90. Warren, supra note 71, at 613. 
91. See Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963); In re Philadel- 
phia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3rd Cir. 1960). 
92. Lacy, supra note 87, at 483-84 (footnote omitted). 
93. Id. at 481. 
The proposed revisions of the Bankruptcy Act, which failed to pass in 1977, would 
solve this problem. If the trustee in bankruptcy rejects the contract, the purchaser in 
possession may elect to terminate the contract or to remain in possession. If he remains 
in possession, he must continue to make payments, but may offset against these payments 
any damages incurred because of rejection. The trustee in bankruptcy must deliver title 
to the purchaser in accordance with the provisions of the contract, but is relieved of all 
other obligations. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see H.R. REP NO. 95-595, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 347-50 (1977). 
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contract. If the vendor is delinquent in payment of federal taxes, 
the United States may obtain a lien on "all property and rights 
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to [the delin- 
quent t a ~ p a y e r ] . " ~ ~  This lien is ineffective against "any pur- 
chaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judg- 
ment lien creditor until notice thereof . . . has been filedyYg5 in a 
designated place. Thus, for example, if a grantee recorded a con- 
veyance of the taxpayer-grantor's property for adequate and full 
consideration prior to the filing of a tax lien and without actual 
knowledge of the lien, the grantee's title would not be encum- 
bered by the lien. A fortiori, if the lien arose after the conveyance, 
the grantee is protected. Before the 1966 amendments to the Fed- 
eral Tax Lien Act, however, there was case law indicating that a 
vendee who had taken possession under an installment land con- 
tract, but who had not received legal title, did not come within 
the statutory definition of a "purchaser" and thus was subject not 
only to preexisting unfiled tax liens, but also to liens for taxes 
arising against the vendor after the contract was executed and the 
vendee went into possession." Now, however, that problem has 
been largely obviated by the rule which provides that a person 
who enters into a written executory contract to purchase property 
is afforded the protection of a "purchaser" with title.g7 Thus, in 
most situations the contract vendee who takes possession pur- 
suant to an installment land contract is protected against unfiled 
tax liens arising against the vendor before the execution of the 
contract and against all such liens arising thereafter. 
There is still, however, a potential pitfall for some vendees. 
Under the Federal Tax Lien Act, protection of the contract 
vendee as a "purchaser" is "conditioned upon his having taken 
whatever action is necessary under local law to protect his inter- 
est against subsequent purchasers without actual notice."98 In 
most states the contract vendee's possession qualifies as construc- 
tive notice against such subsequent purchasers. However, in 
those states where possession does not so qualify,gg recording is 
necessary. Thus, in view of the fact that many vendees do not 
record, it is conceivable that a vendee, after properly examining 
94. I.R.C. 5 6321. 
95. I.R.C. 5 6323(a). 
96. See United States v. Creamer Indus., Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1965); Leipert 
v. R.C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
97. W. PLUMB, F E D E ~ L  TAX LIENS 73 (3d ed. 1972). 
98. Id. at 73. 
99. See note 86 supra. 
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title at the time of execution of the contract and promptly going 
into possession, may nevertheless be vulnerable to tax liens aris- 
ing after the execution of the installment land contract. 
B. Problems for Vendors 
As was pointed out earlier, there have been relatively few 
title problems for the vendor in those states that specifically regu- 
late forfeiture by statutory procedure. In those states, of which 
Iowa and Minnesota are typical, the statutory procedure for ter- 
mination has been institutionalized, and the statutes provide a 
mechanism for establishing record title in the vendor even if the 
vendee has recorded the contract. However, in states without 
such statutory mechanisms, and where the forfeiture clause is 
governed solely or largely by case law, there are potential title 
problems for the vendor. Indeed, in many such jurisdictions, the 
installment land contract "will provide the . . . vendor with an 
efficient and cheap method of regaining possession of the contract 
land and a merchantable title only if the vendee fails completely 
to assert his rights."loO As one commentator has noted: 
Thus, if, after default, the vendee moves out of possession, with- 
out protest and without having recorded the contract, the ven- 
dor will be able to resell the land to a person who will probably 
qualify as a bona fide purchaser. In practice this probably often 
happens and may explain, in part, why the installment land 
contract is continually used. The thing to remember, however, 
is that any device is practical if the other party does nothing to 
protect his rights.lO' 
On the other hand, suppose the vendee attempts to protect 
his rights by recording his contract and thereafter goes into de- 
fault. Even assuming that a court will find that enforcing forfeit- 
ure would be valid under the circumstances, it will take a judi- 
cial proceeding to make that determination. A statement or affi- 
davit that forfeiture has occurred, recorded by the vendor, will 
probably not suffice. 
Thus, the vendor is faced with the costly prospect of a quiet title 
action or some other judicial proceeding to regain a marketable 
title. The vendee, for settlement purposes, may very well be able 
to demand much more than what he has invested in the prop- 
erty as the price for a quit-claim deed.lo2 
- - - - - 
100. Nelson, supra note 15, at 165 (emphasis in original). 
101. Id. at 165 (emphasis in original). 
102. Id. 
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Some vendors try to eliminate such problems by attempting 
to prevent the recording of the contract. The most common 
method used to accomplish this is to omit an acknowledgment of 
the parties' execution of the contract. For any vendee represented 
by counsel, however, this method is easily circumvented by re- 
cording an affidavit in which the vendee refers to the installment 
land contract and attaches the contract as an exhibit. Or, as a 
variation, the vendee could execute and record an affidavit that 
incorporates the essential terms of the contract, including the 
legal description, the parties, and the important terms. Occasion- 
ally, a vendor will attempt to prevent recording by keeping all 
copies of the contract. Again, however, it would seem that the 
vendee could use the second affidavit method described above. 
After all, if in fact a land contract exists, it would surely not be 
improper for a vendee to summarize the terms of that contract 
in an affidavit. In jurisdictions that do not permit recordation of 
affidavits, another variant would be to record an acknowledged 
assignment of the purchaser's interest to a straw party and a 
reassignment back to the vendee.lo3 
Vendors also occasionally attempt to discourage recording by 
the vendee by including a provision in the installment land con- 
tract that makes recording of the contract a ground for default 
and forfeiture. Such provisions may have a substantial deterrent 
effect because the risk of forfeiture can never be taken lightly. 
Nevertheless, such provisions probably violate the public policy 
of encouraging the recording of interests in real estate. Indeed, 
Professor Warren has indicated that it  is doubtful that such 
clauses would be effective "to attain anything more than the 
hostility of the judge who has to interpret the contract."lo4 
Stated simply, in states where the above title complications 
to the vendor can occur, the installment land contract can be a 
"pro-vendee" financing device. Where, for example, such con- 
tracts are used in a wholesale fashion as substitute financing 
devices in low income, low down payment situations, mass re- 
cording of such contracts by vendees could increase the vendees' 
practical economic interests in the involved real estate and possi- 
bly result in pervasive title clouds on substantial amounts of that 
103. Id. at 165-66. As we shall see, a vendee's interest is mortgagable. See text accom- 
panying note 108 infra. Thus, even if a vendee does not record, a recorded mortgage from 
the vendee will similarly cloud the title. It is unlikely that recording by the vendee under 
these circumstances will constitute slander on the vendor's title. See Nelson, supra note 
15, at 166. 
104. Warren, supra note 71, at 629. 
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real estate. 
The foregoing, of course, is not intended to deemphasize the 
risks for the vendee under installment land contracts. Many of 
these risks have been discussed previously. Where the vendee has 
paid a substantial amount of the contract and then defaults, the 
vendor may choose to go to court to seek enforcement of a forfeit- 
ure clause. Notwithstanding clouds on the vendor's title, what 
if the court determines that forfeiture is reasonable? In that event 
a vendee could lose his entire equity without a public sale. In 
addition, some local recorders may occasionally block attempts 
by vendees to record evidence of their contracts.lo5 In other words, 
the installment land contract device means, a t  best, uncertainty 
for both sides. 
I t  is perhaps understandable that,  notwithstanding the 
above risks, installment land contracts would be used in states 
where mortgages must be foreclosed by a costly and time- 
consuming judicial action. This helps to explain why such con- 
tracts are popular in Iowa and Illinois where such a judicial pro- 
ceeding is the only foreclosure remedy. On the other hand, in 
many states, of which Missouri and Utah are typical, where the 
power of sale mortgage or deed of trust is permissible and where 
foreclosure is efficient and relatively inexpensive, reliance on the 
installment land contract is difficult to understand or justify. lo6 
Several possible explanations may be suggested. First, the use of 
installment land contracts may spill over from states where they 
have been used successfully for the good reasons discussed above 
to adjacent states where such use is especially dangerous for ven- 
dors. Second, many vendors may use land contracts in low down 
payment situations and take their chances that the vendees will 
be too unsophisticated to record or to otherwise protect their 
interests. Finally, many vendors may simply want to feel assured 
105. A recorder who strictly adheres to statutory language defining recordable docu- 
ments could conceivably justify a refusal to record such evidence of a contract. For exam- 
ple, Utah law provides for the recordation of conveyance instruments, but the definition 
of "conveyance" arguably eliminates the instrument here in issue: 
The term "conveyance" as used in this title shall be construed to embrace 
every instrument in writing by which any real estate, or interest in real estate, 
is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases 
for a term not exceeding one year. 
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 57-1-1 (1974). 
106. While it is true that power of sale foreclosure has been under constitutional 
attack on fourteenth amendment due process hearing and notice grounds, those attacks 
have been meeting with diminishing success, primarily due to the reluctance of the courts 
to find state action in foreclosures by nongovernmental lenders. See notes 72-82 and 
accompanying text supra. 
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that they will receive their land back in the event of a default by 
the vendee. With a mortgage or a deed of trust, of course, the 
mortgagee must ultimately foreclose against a defaulting mortga- 
gor; a third party could purchase at the sale, and the mortgagee 
thus could be left with money and not the land. Nonetheless, in 
view of the uncertainty of the enforceability of the forfeiture 
clause in many, if not most, jurisdictions that do not regulate 
installment land contracts specifically by statute, reliance on the 
forfeiture clause to regain one's land is dubious a t  best.lo7 
IV. MORTGAGING THE VENDEE'S INTEREST: PROBLEMS FOR 
MORTGAGEES 
As a vendee pays off his obligations under an installment 
land contract or if, in any event, the land goes up in value, the 
vendee's interest can become a significant economic asset. Thus, 
it is a relatively common practice for a vendee to seek to borrow 
money by using his interest as security for the loan. Functionally, 
of course, a mortgage on a vendee's interest is the economic equiv- 
alent of a second mortgage, because the vendor holds an interest 
analogous to a first purchase money mortgage on the land. In- 
creasingly, the case law recognizes the proposition that the 
vendee's interest is mortgagable.lo8 
To state this latter proposition, however, raises some serious 
questions. For many courts, the determination that the vendee 
has an interest which can be mortgaged includes the notion that 
mortgages of such interests are valueless unless the mortgagee has 
some way to protect his interest against the vendor's declaration 
of forfeiture. Thus, a number of cases have held that the vendor 
could not declare a forfeiture of an installment land contract 
without giving the vendee's mortgagee both notification of intent 
to forfeit and an opportunity to protect himself.109 Furthermore, 
recording by the vendee's mortgagee constitutes, under the rea- 
soning of these cases, constructive notice to the vendor of the 
mortgagee's existence and imposes a duty on the vendor to exam- 
ine the title to the land prior to a declaration of forfeiture in order 
to insure that notice can be given to any subsequent mortgagee 
of the vendee's interest. One recent decision, however, has held 
107. See Nelson, supra note 15, at 167-68. 
108. See Davis & Son v. Milligan, 88 Ala. 523,6 So. 908 (1889); Stannard v. Marboe, 
159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); Fincher v. Miles Homes of Mo., Inc., 549 S.W.2d 
848 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969). 
109. See, e.g., Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119,198 N.W. 127 (1924). See 45 WASH. 
L. REV. 645, 646 (1970). 
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that, absent actual knowledge of the mortgagee's existence, the 
vendor is under no obligation to notify the mortgagee of his inten- 
tion to declare a forfeiture."O This case relied on the notion that 
the recording of an instrument constituted notice only to those 
acquiring interest in the land subsequent to a recording and not 
to those whose interests predated that recording. The practical 
effect of such reasoning will mean that a mortgagee, in order to 
protect himself, will be required to give actual notice to the ven- 
dor a t  the time the mortgagee takes his security interest. 
Assuming that notification of an intent to invoke forfeiture 
reaches the vendee's mortgagee, how may the latter protect 
himself? It has been suggested that notification would permit the 
mortgagee to fulfill the obligations of the vendee under the con- 
tract."' If this means that  the mortgagee may take over the 
vendee's interest without foreclosure of the mortgage, it would 
seem to be clearly erroneous, since it would confer on a mortgagee 
of the vendee greater rights than those possessed by a second 
mortgagee in the normal mortgage situation. In the normal situa- 
tion, the second mortgagee, when the senior mortgage goes into 
default, has two options. First, he may pay off or redeem the 
senior mortgage and stand in the senior's shoes as an assignee of 
that mortgage. At that point, the second mortgagee would own 
two mortgages on the land and would have to foreclose one or 
both of them in order to acquire either money or title to the land. 
Alternatively, the second mortgagee could foreclose his mortgage, 
and the purchaser at  that sale would buy the land subject to the 
first mortgage.l12 The foreclosing second mortgagee would get title 
only if he were the successful purchaser a t  the sale. Otherwise, 
the second mortgagee would have his lien paid off. But in no 
event can the second mortgagee acquire title to the land without 
himself foreclosing. 
In applying the mortgage analogy to the installment land 
contract situation, it would seem that the vendee's mortgagee 
should have no greater rights than a "normal" second mortgagee. 
In other words, the vendee's mortgagee should have two options. 
First, he could pay off the defaulted land contract and have all 
the rights of an assignee of the vendor under that contract. As- 
suming forfeiture is enforceable in his jurisdiction, the 
110. Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969). See also Miles Homes, 
Inc. v. Grant, 257 Iowa 697, 134 N.W.2d 569 (1965) (interpreting the Iowa statutory 
termination proceeding). 
111. 45 WASH. L. REV. 645, 646 (1970). 
112. See G. NEBON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, at 242-43. 
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mortgagee-assignee presumably could then himself invoke the 
forfeiture rights under the contract. But in no event should he be 
able to eradicate the vendee's interest without invoking the func- 
tional equivalent of foreclosure. Second, the mortgagee could 
choose to foreclose his mortgage on the vendee's interest. In that  
case the purchaser at  the sale would buy the land subject to the 
vendor's rights. The mortgagee would either purchase the land 
himself or be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. This second 
option is, of course, highly risky, because if the vendor is able to 
invoke forfeiture promptly, the purchaser at  the vendee's mortga- 
gee's foreclosure sale may simply be buying nothing. 
Very often, mortgagees of a vendee's interest make the mis- 
take of taking an assignment of the vendee's interest and a quit- 
claim deed from the vendee as security for the loan to the vendee. 
This transaction, of course, will be treated substantively as a 
mortgage.l13 The problem is tha t  the use of such documents 
means that  the mortgagee's second option, foreclosure of his 
mortgage, must be accomplished by a costly and time-consuming 
judicial action. This is because the assignment and quitclaim 
deed will contain no power of sale, so that even if the particular 
jurisdiction permits nonjudicial foreclosure, the mortgagee could 
not utilize that remedy. Thus, if a mortgage on a vendee's interest 
is desired and if the applicable jurisdiction permits nonjudicial 
foreclosure, the mortgagee of the vendee should utilize a mortgage 
or deed of trust with an express power of sale instead of the 
assignment and quitclaim type documents. 
Traditionally, the forfeiture remedy available under install- 
ment land contracts has involved substantial risks for vendees 
and considerable benefits for vendors. In modem practice, how- 
ever, the risk allocation has changed. To be sure, vendees under 
installment contracts may suffer severely when forfeiture occurs. 
They may also experience title problems that would not arise 
under a purchase money mortgage. But the use of installment 
land contracts also involves serious risks for vendors. 
Vendors may also have to contend with problems of title. In 
some jurisdictions, a defaulting vendee may actually be able to  
demand a greater amount of money to relinquish his interest than 
113. See Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969); Cunningham & 
Tischler, Disguised Real Estate Security Transactions as Mortgages in Substance, 26 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1972). 
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he has invested in the property. The alternative for a vendor 
seeking to remove a cloud on his title may be a costly quiet title 
action. Problems of this nature can be absolutely avoided only 
when the vendee completely fails to assert his rights. Given the 
increasing availability of legal services to the poor, however, it is 
likely that such rights will be asserted with increasing vigor in the 
future. 
Beyond these problems with title, however, is a more basic 
difficulty for vendors. Simply stated, the contractual provision 
for forfeiture may be unenforceable in many situations. Given the 
various judicial approaches seeking to mitigate the harshness of 
forfeiture, the enforcement of the remedy will generally be uncer- 
tain a t  best. Except in those states that have enacted statutes 
approving forfeiture after a specified grace period has elapsed, 
vendor reliance on contractual forfeiture provisions is nothing 
short of foolish. Even in those states that regulate forfeiture by 
statute, however, the risk of a holding of unconstitutionality re- 
mains. 
In view of the risks involved in land contracts in modern 
practice and the trend toward limiting the forfeiture remedy, the 
land contract should become an increasingly unattractive vendor 
financing option. As the undesirability of the land contract be- 
comes more apparent, the alternative use of the mortgage or deed 
of trust should become more appealing to vendors. This will a t  
least be true in those states that have statutorily provided for an 
expeditious and constitutional method of foreclosure. State legis- 
latures that have not yet enacted statutes approving power of sale 
foreclosures that comply with due process standards should do 
The enactment of such statutes will encourage a shift away 
from installment contracts and toward mortgages and trust 
deeds-a shift that will promote the interests of vendors and 
vendees while it reduces the risks to both. 
114. For examples of recent attempts to create nonjudicial foreclosure procedures 
that will be quick, inexpensive, and constitutional, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $5 
61.24.010-.I30 (Supp. 1976), discussed in Leen & Gose, Non-judicial Deed of Trust 
Foreclosures, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, JulyIAug. 1975, at 36; UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT 
§ 3-501(f); S. 2507, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. $9  401-419, 119 CONG. REc. 32,166, 32,175-76 
(1973). Each of these attempts greatly expands traditional notice provisions, but none has 
hearing requirements extensive enough to meet constitutional demands. An adequate 
hearing can, however, be built into a power of sale foreclosure statute without undue 
difficulty. See Nelson, Constitutional Problems with Power of Sale Foreclosure: A Judicial 
Dilemma, to be published in 43 Mo. L. REV. (1978). 
